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ACCORD AND SATISFACTION-EXECUTORY ACCORD-PLEADING AN ACCORD
AS A BAR TO THE ORIGINAL ACTION.-REILLY v. BARRETT (1917) II5 N. E.
(N. Y.) 453.-As a bar to an action to recover damages for personal
injuries, the defendant pleaded an agreement with the plaintiff whereby
the latter agreed to receive $200 in full satisfaction. Tender of the money
and the plaintiff's refusal to accept it were alleged, but there was no
allegation that the defendant's promise was to be received in satisfaction
of the claim. Held, that this was a mere executory accord, not followed
by satisfaction, and therefore no bar to the action.
The rule is that an accord without satisfaction is insufficient to bar
the original action. Schwartf ager v. Pittsburg, etc., Ry. (1913) 238 Pa.
St. 158; Kennedy v. Maddox (1914) 15 Ga. App. 684. A consideration
is necessary to render an accord and satisfaction valid; but the amount
of satisfaction is immaterial. Decker v. Smith (1916) 88 N. J. L. 630;
Beebe v. Worth (1914) 146 N. Y. S. 146. In the case of a liquidated
claim, payment of a less sum is not a consideration; where the claim
is unliquidated, the acceptance of any sum is an accord and satisfaction
of the whole claim. Nassoiy v. Tomlinson (1896) 148 N. Y. 326; Hand
Lumber Co. v. Hall (19o6) 147 Ala. 561. If the agreement is to accept
a promise in satisfaction, without requiring performance of that promise,
the promise itself is a good satisfaction. Manley v. Life Ins. Co. (i9o6)
78 Vt 331; Bell v. Pitman (191i) 143 Ky. 521. To be available as a
defence, accord and satisfaction must be specially pleaded. Covell v.
Carpenter (19o2) 24 R. L I ; Fogil v. Boody (1go3) 76 Conn. 194. It
can not be set up under the general issue or a plea of not guilty. Gosset
v. R. R. ('9o5) 115 Tenn. 376. The plea must allege that the matter was
accepted in satisfaction; mere readiness to perform the accord, or a
tender of performance, or even a part performance, will not do. Hearn
v. Kiehl (1861) 2 Wright (Pa.) 147; Cooke v. McAdoo (1914) 85 N. J. L.
692; Hancock v. Yaden (1889) 121 Ind. 366. When pleaded, accord and
satisfaction must be proved as any other agreement Phillips v. Graham
Co. (1915) 17 Ariz. 2o8; Meyers v. Grantham (1916) 187 S. W. (Tex.)
532. If pleaded by the defendant, the burden is upon him to show every
element necessary to constitute it. La Plata County v. Durnell (i9c)
17 Col. App. 85. Where the plaintiff in making out his own case is com-
pelled to get rid of an accord, his evidence should go far enough to
make out at least a prima facie case against it. Browning v. Crouse
(i88o) 43 Mich. 489. The earlier courts said that no action would lie
for breach of an executory accord. Lynn v. Bruce (1794) 2 H. BL 317.
Though recognizing that until executed an accord can be no bar to an
existing action, the courts of to-day treat an executory accord as a




v. DAvirr Er AL. (1917) 115 N. E. (N. Y.) 476-The defendant's testator
having been discharged as a bankrupt under the Federal Act of I898
(c. 541, 30 St 544) a compromise was effected under the provisions of
the act. The plaintiff accepted this compromise. Later the defendant's
testator promised to pay the plaintiff the balance as soon as he sold his
mill. Held, that a discharge in bankruptcy through a composition was
not 4 voluntary extinguishment of the debt and that a subsequent promise
was binding.
A subsequent promise to pay a debt voluntarily discharged is not
binding for want of legal consideration. Stafford v. Bacon (1841) I Hill
(N. Y.) 532; (erroneously reported in 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 384); Warren
v. Whitney (1845) 24 Me. 561; Evans v. Bell (1885) 15 Lea (Tenn.)
569. Yet a subsequent promise to pay a debt discharged by operation
of law is binding. McNair v. Gilbert (1829) 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 344;
Wait v. Morris (1831) 6 Wend. (N. T.) 394; Fitzgerald v. Alexander
(1838) i9 Wend. (N. Y.) 402; Dusenbury v. Hoyt (1873) 53 N. Y.
521; Code of Civil Procedure of N. Y., sec. 481. A discharge in bank-
ruptcy through a composition is not a voluntary release or extinguish-
ment of the debt. Cohen v. Lachenmaier (1912) 147 Wis. 649; In matter
Merriman's Estate (1878) 44 Conn. 587; Guild v. Butler (1877) 122
Mass. 498; contra, Taylor v. Skiles (igo4) 113 Tenn. 288 (authorities
cited not in point). Hence it is submitted that the principal case is correct
and seems to be the first in New York to sustain this proposition.
F. C. H.
CAmsERS-BUMIAL OF BoDy AT SEA-DuTy TO NEXT Op KIN.-FINLEY V.
ATLANTIC TRANsPORT Co., LTD. (1917) 1I5 N. E. (N. Y.) 715.-A pas-
senger on defendant's steamship died five days before the ship arrived
at New York. The body was embalmed and put into such condition that
it could have been carried to New York, but the day before reaching
port the body was buried at sea. Held, that it was the common-law duty
of the steamship company to transport the body to New York and deliver
it for burial to the parties entitled to its possession, and for breach of
such duty a son had a cause of action. Collin, J., dissenting.
The courts have frequently declared that a dead body is not property
or a subject of property rights. In re Wong Yung Quy (188o) 6 Sawy.
(U. Se) 442. Thus no writ or action of replevin will lie for a dead body,
nor is a dead body subject to a lien for the price of goods furnished
during life, or for the value of the casket enclosing the remains. Guthrie
v. Weaver (1876) 1 Mo. App. 136; Reg. v. Fox (1841) 2 Q. B. 246;
Keyes v. Konkel (1899) II9 Mich. 550. It is well settled, however, that
there is a legal right to possession and control for purposes of burial and
for preserving the remains inviolate for breach of which an action ies.
Williams v. Williams "(i882) 2o Ch. D. 659; Larson v. Chase (1891)
47 Minn. 3o7; -Palenzke v. Bruning (Igoo) 98 Ill. App. 644; Pierce v.
Proprietors of Cemetery (1872) I X. I. 227. The right in question is
held to be in the next of kin. Larson v. Chase, supra; Darcy v. Presby-
terian Hospital (xgii) o2 N. Y. 259. Under ordinary circumstances,
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burial at sea with the custom in such matters discharges the duty which
the law imposes. But under the novel circumstances of the principal
case, in the likht of changing custom, due to improvements in embalming
and in the rapidity of transportation, it is submitted -that the decision is
correct.
E. J. M.
CARIuERs-NoN-DELvERY-lREsTRAINT OF PmxNCES-NoRTH GERMAN
LLOYD CLAIMANT OF KRONPRINZESSIN CECmIE v. GUARANTY TRUST Co. OF
N. Y. AND NATIONAL CITY BANK OF N. Y. (1917) 37 Sup. CT. REP. 490.-
The defendant contracted with the plaintiffs respectively to deliver ship-
ments of gold at London via Plymouth and at Paris via Cherbourg; but
was not to be liable for loss by "arrest and restraint of princes, rulers or
people." When still two days from Plymouth the master received a
telegram from the ship's owners at Bremen, stating, 'War has broken
out with England, France and Russia. Turn back to New York." The
master turned back, putting into Bar Harbor, Me. The owners knew
the message to be false, but the master did not. Held, that this was not
a breach of defendant's contract. Pitney and Clarke, JJ., dissenting.
For a discussion of the principles involved in this case, see (1917) 26
YALE LAw JOURNAL, 247. W.
CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS-LIABILITY FOR ToRT&-LoEFFLER v. TRUsTEES
OF SHEPPARD AND ENOcH PRATT HOSPITAL (1917) I0 ATL. (MD.) 301.-
The plaintiff, a fireman properly engaged in extinguishing a fire, was
injured because of the defective condition of a fire-escape in the building
of the defendant, a charitable institution. Held, that the doctrine of
respondeat superior does not apply in the case of charitable institutions
whose funds are held in trust for special purposes.
The general rule has been to exempt charitable institutions from
liability for the torts of their agents and servants. Overholser v. National
Home for Disabled Soldiers (19o3) 68 Oh. St. 236; McDonald v.
Massachusetts General Hospital (1876) 120 Mass 432. Some courts have
given as their reason for so holding that the funds should not be dis-
sipated in giving damages since the object of the institution is a charitable
one. Jensen v. Maine Eye and Ear Infirmary (1912) 1o7 Me. 408. This
reason does not prevail in actions for breach of contract, as a charitable
institution is liable ii damages in such case. Another reason given for
refusing to apply the doctrine of respondeat superior is that the work is
not for the benefit of the institution, but for the benefit of its inmates.
Farrigan v. Pevear (19o6) 193 Mass. 147. This seems to be an inadequate
reason; for in most cases it -is not necessary that a principal be benefited
by the servant's acts to be held liable. If the act is in the course of
the servant's employment, the principal is answerable. Huffcut, Agency,
p. 158. Still another reason given by some courts is that in cases where
the person injured was seeking to obtain a benefit from the charitable
institution he impliedly assumed the risk of injury due to negligence.
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This of course is a fiction. These courts really hold that the plaintiff
cannot recover whether he assumed the risk or not. It is submitted
that the better rule is to allow the plaintiff to recover, so as to induce
the defendant to use greater care in the-management of its servants and in
the carrying out the purposes of the trust. A recent tendency of some
courts has been to give relief at the expense of charitable institutions.
Hordern v. Salvation Army (gio) igg N. Y. 233 (defective runway);
Mclnerny v. St. Luke's Hospital Association of Duluth (913) x22 Minn.
1o (dangerous machinery); St. Paul's Sanitorium v. Williamson (1914)
164 S. W. (Tex.) 36 (hiring unskilful nurse); Tucker v. Mobile
Infirmary Association (1915) 191 Ala. 572.
F. L. McC.
CHosEs iN ACTION-NATURE oF PARTiAL ASSIGqN&'s INTEREsT-EFFEcT
ON ASSIGNOR'S INTEmsT oF JumrmNT n FAVOR oF PArrr L AssIGNmE-
CARVIML V. MnRGo F3LMS, INC. (1917) 163 N. Y. S. 268.-An employee
discharged in breach of his contract assigned his claim for damages
accruing up to a certain date, reserving to himself all damages accruing
after that period. The partial assignee sued alone, and recovered against
the employer. The assignor now sues the latter who sets up as a defense
the partial assignees previous recovery. Held, that the assignor is
entitled to recover.
It may not be inappropriate to notice that the word interest is used
here to designate the aggregate of one's rights, privileges, powers and
immunities. See Professor Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Concep-
tions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (1913) 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, I6.
The interest of the partial assignee was not protected at common law, but
only in equity, as the device of the power of attorney was not applicable
to the partial alienation of a chose in action. See Ames, Cases on Trusts,_
(2d ed.) pp. 63, 64. In many code states, however, a court of law will
now enforce the partial assignees claim against the debtor. The result
is that the partial assignee's interest is no longer exclusively equitable, but
concurrently legal and equitable. See Professor Cook, Alienability of
Choses in Action (1917) 30 HARv. L. Ry. 449, 455; Dickinson v..Tysen
(1913) 209 N. Y. 395, 397; School District v. Edwards (1879) 46 Wis. 15o;
Guagler v. Chicago, Maud P. S. Ry. Co. (1912) 197 Fed. 79. Most
jurisdictions -require that the assignor be joined as a party to the suit
against the debtor. This rule is merely one of procedure to be complied
with in order to protect' the defendant against a multiplicity of suits.
O'Dougherty v. Remington Paper Co. (i88o) 81 N. Y. 496; United States
v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U. S. 61; Hughes v. Dundee Co. (1886) 26
Fed. 831. It may be waived by consent of the parties. The Fourth
National Bank v. Noonan (1884) 14 Mo. App. 243; aff'd. (1885) 88 Mo.
372; Flanders v. Canada, etc., Co. (19o8) 161 Fed. 378; aff'd. (19o8)
165 Fed. 321. The partial assignee will thus be allowed to sue alone.
Risley v. Phenix Bank (i881) 83 N. Y. 318; Caledonia Ins. Co. v. North-
ern Pacific Ry. Co. (1904) 32 Mont. 46. Non-joinder of the assignor
being demurrable, it seems perfectly justifiable to interpret the defendant's
silence on the point as a waiver of his privilege and power to object to
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the splitting of the cause of action. See the principal case. Judgment in
favor of the partial assignee is then no bar to a later action brought
by the assignor. In states where the partial assignee's only standing is in
equity, the assignor has, in the part which he did not assign, an interest con-
currently legal and equitable; he has, in addition, in the part which he did
assign, an interest exclusively legal which conflicts with his assignee's para-
mount equitable interest. In states where the partial assignees interest
is concurrently legal and equitable, the assignor's interest is also concur-
rently legal and equitable, but strictly limited to the part of the chose
in action which he did not assign. In the part which he did assign, he
has no interest, either at law or in equity. See Professor Cook, Alienability
of Choses in Action (0917) 3o HAv. L. REv. 449, 455-46o. R. P.
CoNFPicT oi Lws-DuE PRocss-SERvIc oN ABSENT DEFENDAxT By
PUBLICATION.-McDONALm V. MABEE (X917) 37 Sup. CT. REP. 343.- The
defendant, domiciled in Texas, but having gone to Missouri with the
intention of permanently residing there, was served by publication and a
personal judgment rendered against him on a promissory note. In error
to the U. S. Supreme Court, he contended this was a denial of due
process. Held, that there was such a denial.
The decisions as to the validity of personal judgments against absent
domiciled citizens by publication of service have hitherto been in irre-
concilable conflict. Henderson v. Staniford (187o) io5 Mass. 5o4; Raher
v. Raher (xi) i5o Ia. 511. The latter case held that no personal judg-
ment could be rendered against a citizen and resident of a state tempo-
rarily absent therefrom, even though personally served, the service 
being
required to be within the limits of the state. The majority opinion 
relied
on Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 U. S. 714, but anything in the Pennoyer
v. Neff case favorable to this view is dictum. Henderson v. Staniford,
supra, decided that the contractual obligation made in California 
-was
well discharged by a California judgment, though rendered after 
service
by publication -on the defendant, who was a domiciled citizen of 
Cali-
fornia temporarily absent. The Massachusetts court was thus 
consistent
with the weight of authority, which holds that the law governing 
the
primary obligation of a contract governs in like manner the secondary
obligation: that is, the Massachusetts court was merely incorporating 
the
lex loci contractuas (here California) and deciding that it would adopt
and incorporate such law throughout all the obligations which might 
arise
as a result of the contract. See Professor Hohfeld in (i9o9) 
9 Cor. L.
REv.; comment in (917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 771. The important
case of De la Montanya vt. De la Montanya (i896) 112 Cal. ioi, held 
that
a decree of alimony, operating as a judgment in personam against 
a
domiciled citizen of California, temporarily without the state, there 
being
notice by publication, was void because of lack of due process. 
A parallel
situation to that in the principal case, in which the defendant 
never
intended to return to Texas, was presented in the recent 
New York case
of Grubel vt. Nassauer (1913) 2io N. Y. i49, in which the court 
refused
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recognition to a German judgment rendered against the defendant by
publication during his residence in America with the declared intentioff
of assuming American citizenship. The principal case contains a very
important intimation to the effect that perhaps a summons left at the
defendant's last and usual place of abode would have been sufficient to
give the judgment validity. It is to be regretted that the court did not
render a decision squarely on this important point, as it is fairly involved
in the case. However, its direct holding as to the invalidity of the Texas
judgment would seem in accord with the authorities, though conceivably
a strong argument might be made for a contrary conclusion. See the
vigorous dissenting 9pinion of Mr. Justice Deemer in Raher v. Raher
(1911) 150 ILa. 511, 533.
A.N. H.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-SERvICE OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION-CAUsE OF
AcTION ARISING OUTSIDE OF STATE-PENNSYLVANIA FIRE INS. Co. v.
GOLD ISSUE MIN. & MILL. Co. (1917) 37 SUP. CT. REP. 344.-A policy
insuring certain buildings in Arizona was issued in Colorado by the
plaintiff in error, an Arizona corporation. The insurance company had
obtained a license to do business in Missouri, and in compliance with
the statutes Of that state filed with the superintendent of the insurance
department a power of attorney to accept service of process on behalf
of the company, "so long as it should have any liabilities outstanding in
the state." The present suit to recover money alleged to be due on the
iolicy was begun by service upon the superintendent. The insurance
company contended that such service of process was not due process
of law and was insufficient, claiming that the statute referred only to
suits arising from Missouri contracts. Held, that the service of process
was sufficient as it was in compliance with the statute.
Although a corporation has no corporate existence outside the state
of its creation, as a general rule, on the grounds of comity, the corpora-
tion may exercise many of its powers within another tate. Kirvin v.
Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. (i9o6) 145 Fed. 288; Oriental Ins. Co.
v. Daggs (1898) 172 U. S. 557. In other words, a corporation of one
state cannot do business in another without the latter's consent; and
this consent may be accompanied by such conditions as the state may
think proper to impose. St. Clair v. Cox (1882) io6 U. S. 356. As one
of these conditions; the state may provide for service of process upon
a foreign corporation acting in the state, by requiring such corporation
to name some agent upon whom service may be made. State v. Petroleum
Co. (I9os) s8 W. Va. 1o8; Mutual Reserve Ass'n v. Phelps (igo) igo
U. S. 147. The weight of modern authorities seems to support the
proposition that when a corporation has an agent for such service and
is doing business in the foreign jurisdiction, the corporation may be
sued upon any transitory cause of action. Reeves v. Southern Rev. Co.
(1904) 121 Ga. 565; Bogdon, v. Phila. & Reading C. & L Co. (1916) 217
N. Y. 439; Johnston v. Trade Ins. Co. (1882) 132 Mass. 432. And this
without regard to the residence of the plaintiff or the place at which
the cause of action arose. Hawkens v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. (x9o5) 123
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Ga. 722. For if a resident of the state be allowed to bring suit, every
citizen of the United States would have a similar right. Chambers v.
B. & 0. R. R. Co., (i9o7) 2o7 U. S. 142; Blake v. McClung (1898)
172 U. S. 239; Cole v. Cunningham (1889) 133 U. S. I7, 114. The above
action on a contract was such a transitory action and should be enforcible
wherever the defendant could 'be found.
A. S. B.
CONTRACTs-OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE-THE GLEANER-(1917) 240 FED.
I63.-The owner of the defendant ship agreed that his vessel "should
stay and receive at ports mentioned all cargoes that may be ready for
shipment to any amount of logs." The charterers were to furnish, at
certain stipulated loading places, whatever logs they wished to ship, and
they were to be cut to certain length. Plaintiff did thereafter place some
logs at several of the loading places, but the defendant failed in one
instance to stay and receive them. Held, that the contract was void for
want of mutuality.
In this case the court considered that the written agreement represented
all of the operative facts in the dispute, and upon that ground decided
the "contract was not binding for want of mutuality." The written agree-
ment, as it seems, being no more than a mere offer, the court was
undoubtedly correct in stating that by it there was no contract. See
Great Northern R. R. Co. v. Witham (1883) 9 C. P. D. 16; Morrow v.
So. Express Co. (I897) 1o Ga. 81o; Rehm-Zeiher Co. v. Walker (i913)
i56 Ky. 6. When it was urged that the placing of the logs at the stipulated
loading place constituted an acceptance of the offer, the court could not
see how a contract void for want of mutuality could be made valid by the
demand of the party not bound. The answer is, clearly that any offer
lacks mutuality, but when accepted becomes a binding contract. If the
resulting contract is bilateral the obligations are then mutual. A reason-
able interpretation of the offer was that it was an offer to make a series
of bilateral contracts, an offer of a promise to transport logs to be made
in return for a promise to pay, acceptances to be made by placing the logs
cut to the agreed lengths at the loading places. There was to be a separate
contract for each lot of logs. Though generally speaking it was an offer
of a promise for an act, it was not an offer to make unilateral contracts.
The act was not to be the agreed equivalent for the promise, but only a
means of acceptance which would express a promise by the other party
to pay the freight. The plaintiff having put a certain number of logs
at one of the wharves, he thereby bound himself to pay the price
charged for carrying them, he had made a bilateral contract concerning
that many logs. Thayer v. Burchard (1868) 99 Mass. 508; Keller v.
Ybarru (1853) 3 Cal. 147. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Witham (x883)
9 C. P. D. 16. The written statement was an offer to make a series of
bilateral contracts, for acceptance as above'did not bind him to ftrnish
logs at other agreed ports nor until they were furnished at such ports
was the defendant bound beyond the one contract to transport From
this point of view the court was probably right in saying that the fact
that the defendant did receive logs at the other ports did not bind him
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to stay and receive them at this port. The furnishing of the logs in each
instance was the acceptance of an offer to carry those very logs. Until
they were ready for loading the defendant was not bound to receive
them-when they were ready he was bound. While the court in the
principal case followed the precedent established by American Cotton
Oil Co. v. Kirk (1895) 68 Fed. 791, and Walker Mfg. Co. v. Swift & Co.
(i9;2) 2oo Fed. 529, it is believed that the foregoing discussion presents
a view more in accord with sound reasoning. In addition, authorities are
not wanting to the effect that the defendant's offer became irrevocable
after the offeree had performed some of the contemplated acts in reliance
thereon. Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire (19o2) 135 Cal. 654;
Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co. (1912) 150 Wis. 517. See Professor Arthur
L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance (1916) 26 YALE LAW JouRNAL, i69, 191.
C.M.
Domicirm-LitABrY To PAY NEw YoRx TRANsmm TA.-xIN RE TRANs-
Fm TAX ON ESTATE or HvY H. R. GaEEN (1917) 57 N. Y. L. J. 213.-
Mrs. Hetty H. R. Green was born in Massachusetts and married a man
who was domiciled in Vermont. During their married life the matri-
monial domicile continued to be in Vermont; their only "home," or
permanent abiding place, being the "Tucker House" in Bellows Falls,
Vermont. After the death of her husband in i9wO, and until her death
in 1916, Mrs. Green spent the greater part of her time away from Ver-
mont, returning to the "Tucker House" for six weeks during each
summer, except the last. While she conducted her large business inter-
ests in New York she lived part of the time in lodging-houses or hotels
in New York City, or at apartments or lodging houses in Hoboken,
New Jersey. Held, that the last residence of Mrs. Green was not within
the state of New York for the purposes of the Transfer Tax Law.
While the legal intendment of the terms "residence" and "domicile"
is not generally the same, the New York Transfer Tax Law has been
construed to make them convertible terms. In re Martin's Estate (1916)
i58 N. Y. S. g15; In re Norton (1916) 159 N. Y. S. 61g. For a similar
construction of the Ohio Statute, cf. Rockfeller v. O'Brien (1915) 224
Fed. 54. Domicile has been regarded in the generic use of the term as
the relation which the law creates between an individual and a particular
locality or country. Bell v. Kennedy (1868) L. R. i H. L. (Sc.) 307.
Domicile is said to determine the status in all common-law countries.
Beale, Conflict of Laws, Pt. i, p. 174. A more satisfactory, although not
complete definition, holds that the domicile of a person is where he ha*
his true fixed, permanent home and principal establishment, and to which
place he has, whenever he is absent, the intention of returning. Story,
Conflict of Laws, sec. 44; Woolsey, Introd. to International Law, sec. 67.
The domicile, or legal residence, of a person when it is acquired through
the choice of -the individual involves a miscellaneous aggregate of facts
concerning his relation to a place. Professor Hohfeld (1913) 23 YALE
LAw JouRNAL, i6, 28. For a variety of purposes, including succession,
every person must have a domicile and but one; and this domicile of
origin will be presumed to continue.until a new one is obtained. Borland
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v. Boston (1882) 132 Mass. 89; Dupuy v. Wur4z (873) 53 N. Y. 556.
As generally stated, in order to acquire a new domicile there must be a
union of intention and residence, animo et facto. In re Newcomb (i9o8)
192 N. Y. 238; Westlake, Conflict of Laws (5thi ed.) p. 363. A new
domicile is not acquired until there is not only an abandonment of the
old residence, but a fixed intention to establish a new residence, followed
by execution of the intent. Boyd's Exr. v. Commonwealth (1912) 149 Ky.
764; De la Montanya v. De la Montanya (1896) 112 Cal. ior. The
domicile of origin or the previous domicile will prevail unless there has
been effected that aggregate of physical and mental facts which are neces-
sary to constitute a change of domicile. Gilman v. Gilman (i863) 52 Me.
165. The principal case, as many previous cases, involved fundamentally
the problem of an accurate analysis of that complex aggregate of fact
and intention, i. e., physical facts and mental facts, which go to make up
the legal concept of domicile. Abington v. North Bridgewater (1840)
23 Pick. (Mass.) 70; Mather v. Cunningham (igog) 105 Me. 326. A
woman through the additional fact of marriage, acquires the domicile of
her husband. Barber v. Barber (1858) 2z How. (U. S.) 582; Jacobs,
Law of Domicile, sec. =. The matrimonial domicile which was acquired
in Vermont by Mrs. Green, and which continued to be in Vermont upon
the death of her husband, does not appear to have been terminated. Her
annual return to the "Tucker House" which she maintained as her only
fixed home, her migratory existence in lodging-houses and hotels, alter-
nating between New York City and Hoboken, New Jersey, and her fixed
intention not to establish a true home in New York, constitute that
aggregate of physical and mental facts which determined her domicile to
be in Vermont at the time of her death.
B. L.
DowER--T HoD op AssiGNis v-MERAL LAND.-SHUP v. RAiNEY
(xg7) xoo ATL. (PA.) 138.-The widow of the deceased was found to
be dowable in certain mineral veins which the deceased had previously
conveyed. .The assignees contended that the court erred in allowing the
widow one-third of the rents and profits of such vein rather than setting
her dower apart by metes and bounds. Held, that where the value of a
mineral vein is not uniform, the widow should be assigned one-third of
the rents and profits.
Equity, in view of the disadvantages of a common-law proceeding, is
generally availed of to afford complete relief in dower proceedings.
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 1381. The rule that a widow is not
dowable in mines not opened during the lifetime of her husband is
general. Staughton v. Leigh (184) 1 Taunt. 4o2; Leufers v. Henke
(1874) 73 Ill. 405. It has been held, however, that where the lands are
available for no other purpose, the widow is dowable in unopened mines.
Seager v. McCabe (1892) 92 Mich. z86. No question of waste is raised
where the mine has already been operated. Coates v. Cheerer (1823) 1
Cow. (N. Y.) 46o. When the assignment of dower by metes and bounds
presents a practical difficulty some other method is employed. A gross
sum has been awarded the widow. Howells et al. v. McGraw et al. (z9o4)
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9o N. Y. S. i. The assessment of a yearly value by the jury, to be paid
over annually to the widow, has been approved. Walker v. Walker
(1878) 2 Ill. App. 418. But almost without exception in the case of
mineral lands the practical difficulties of setting out dower by metes and
bounds has been met by assigning the widow one-third of the rents and
profits. Stoughton v. Leigh, supra; Williams v. Thomas [igog] i Ch.
713; Ware v. Owens (1868) 42 Ala. 212; Clift- v. Clift (I888) 87 Tenn.
17; Strickler v. Tracy (1877) 66 Mo. 465. In most of the cases on the
subject a solution of the problem by alternative occupation or operation
of the mine has been suggested, but none actually employing such a method
has been found.
1. L. S.
EVIDENcE-DELARATION BY DEcEAsED OF INTENTION TO ACT.-GREENACRE
v. FnLBy ET A. (I916) 276 ILL. 294.-In a suit against a saloon keeper
for loss of support by the death of the plaintiff's husband resulting from
his intoxication, evidence was offered by the defendant that the deceased
had, over a period of two years and as recently as the day of his death,
made threats to take his life. Held, that such declarations were inadmis-
sible because not a part of the res gestae nor accompanied by any relevant
act which they served to explain. STATE V. FARNAx (igi6) I6I PAC.
(OR.) 417.-At a trial for murder the declaration of the deceased was
offered in evidence to the effect thaLt she could not go home that after-
noon with the witness because she thought the prisoner was coming to
see her in the evening. Held, that under an exception to the hearsay
rule, the declaration was admissible as showing an intention to meet the
prisoner, though it was not evidence of any intention on the latter's part.
Two views are taken in general by American courts as to te admis-
sion .or exclusion of declarations of intention. The principal cases are
representatives of them. Some courts admit such statements if they are
a part of the res gestae. State v. Smith (I88I) 49 Conn. 376, 381; State
v. Jones (1884) 64 Ia. 349, 353; U. S. v. Nardello (1886) 4 Mackey
(D. C.) 503, 515; State v. Hayward (I8g9) 62 Minn. 474, 484; Balto. &
Ohio R. R. v. State (1895) 8i Md. 371, 383; Nordgren v. People (Igo4)
211 Ill. 425, 433; People v. Atwood (i915) 188 Mich. 36. Such a rule
must of necessity bar statements, even very close in point of time, .when
they fail to accompany an act which is itself receivable in evidence.
State v. Wood (1873) 53 N. H. 484, 494; Com. v. Felch (1882) 132
Mass. 22; Siebert v. People (1892) 143 Ill. 571, 584; State v. Fitzgerald
(I895) 130 Mo. 407, 434; Chi. & En. Ill. R. R. v. Chancellor (1897) I65
Ill. 438, 44i; Foster v. Shephard (1913) 258 Ill. 164, 179. On the other
hand, many courts receive evidence of declarations of intention as being
independently relevant, that is, either as being verbal acts or as coming
within an exception to the hearsay rule, analogous to the exception of
declarations concerning bodily condition. Where this view is taken,
nearby statements of intention come in whether regarded as part of the
res gestae or not. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon (i8gi) 145 U. S.
285, 294; Commonwealth v. Trefethen (1892) 157 Mass. i8o, 185; State
v. Hayward (i89s) 62 Minn. 474, 497; State v. Mortensen (r9o3) 26
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Utah, 312, 333; The San Rafael (i9o5) 72 C. C. A. 388, 397; Common-
wealth v. Howard (1910) 205 Mass. 128, 152; Ickes v. Ickes (I912) 237
Pa. St. 58k, 59o. Remote declarations may be excluded where the court
considers time the test of admissibility. Hale v. Life Indem. & Inv. Co.
(i896) 65 Minn. 548, 55o. Some courts, however, receive even very
remote declarations, ruling that age goes to the weight of such evidence
and not to its admissibility. Blackburn v. State (1873) 23 Oh. St. 146,
165; cf. Redd v. State (i88i) 68 Ala. 492, 496. Of the two general views
exemplified by the principal cases, the latter, recognizing independent
relevancy, would appear to be superior. The former, which operates to
exclude much relevant and enlightening evidence, has been charged with
producing undesirable results and otherwise vigorously criticised. See
Professor Wigmore (1917) ii ILL,. L. REV. 573.
M. B.
EVIDENCE-RES GESTAE-STATEMENT BY ATTOaNEY-ScHANZENBACH V.
STOLLER (1917) I61 N. W. (S. D.) 329.-In a suit for breach of contract
to save himself harmless from the effects of a mortgage, the plaintiff
sought to put in evidence a statement by his attorney to the offeror that
the plaintiff would accept the terms of the offer, only if the appellants
should act as co-:guarantors with the offeror in saving him harmless.
Held, that the testimony was admissible because it was not hearsay, but
part of the res gestae. Whiting, J., dissenting.
The testimony clearly seems to be hearsay in that it was an extra-
judicial statement, and the hearsay- rule excluding it applies, since the
evidence is for the purpose of proving testimonially the truth of the
statement. Greenleaf, Evidence (i6th ed.) sec. ioo. The court cites a
single authority to explain the admissibility of the evidence; namely,
Wigmore, Evidence, secs.- i77o, 1772, and 1777. The sections referred
to are concerned with utterances constituting a verbal part of the act.
As shown by Whiting, J., these sections are not in the least applicable
to the present case, nor do they uphold the view advanced by the court.
The statement in the instant case was not made by the plaintiff nor did
it accompany any act of his. This is essential to its admission on the
grounds set forth by the court. Ford v. Haskell (1865) 32 Conn. 489.
Nor does the evidence meet another requirement necessary to admit it as
an utterance constituting a verbal part of the act; namely, that it must
be independently material to the issues of the case. Patten v. Ferguson
(1847) i8 N. H. 528. F.L. McC.
GiFTs-DNATIo CAUSA MoRTis-NEcEssrry OF PROVING THE CAUSE OF
DEATH-STEVENS V. PROVIDENT INST. rOR SAVINGS (917) 115 N. E.
(MAss.) 404.-The test of the validity of gifts causa mortis is not the
resultant death from the apprehended disease, but rather the fact that
there had been no recovery from that disease, whether or not death was
actually caused thereby.
A donatio causa mortis is a gift, absolute in form, made by the donor
in anticipation of his speedy death. To make such a gift effective it is
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essential that it should be made in reasonable expectation of death.
Barstow v. Tetlow (i916) 115 Me. 96; Northrip v. Burge (914) 255
Mo. 641. Story declares that the validity of the gift is conditional upon
the death of the donor as a result of his existing illness. Story, Equity
Jurisprudence, Vol. I, sec. 6o7a. After this follow dicta in numerous
cases that death must result from that very illness. Robson v. Robson
Adm'r (1866) 3 Del. Ch. 51; Dickeschied v. Bank (1886) 28 W. Va. 340;
Ip' re Elliott's Estate (1913) 159 Ia. xo7. In one case where the party
was taken to a hospital suffering from a disease, ahd death resulted three
months later, recovery was denied on the ground that it was not proved
that the same disorder caused the death. Conser. v. Snowden (i88o)
54 Md. i75. On the other hand, a man who successfully underwent an
operation for a hernia, but who finally died some weeks later of heart
failure was held to have made a valid donatio causa mortis. Ridden v.
Thrall (i8gi) 125 N. Y. 572. This court declares that it is not necessary
that the patient should have died of the same disease, and that it is suf-
ficient if the donor does not recover from the disease from which he then
apprehended death. In the principal case, the decision is not rested upon
this ground alone, but the court found evidence from which to infer
that the woman died as a result of the disease from which she was
suffering four months previously.
J. E. H.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-OPTioN To PURCHASE-.ONDIrroN PRECEDENT
TO LESSOR'S DuTy To CoNvEY.-CooK v. HOUGHTON (1917) ioo ATL. (VT.)
I5.--The defendant leased land to the plaintiff and covenanted that the
plaintiff should be entitled to a deed of the premises at the expiration
of the term, provided he should at that time pay to the defendant a
stipulated amount. Before the expiration of the term the defendant
brought an action of ejectment against the plaintiff, and pending trial
the plaintiff had to give a bond for bail. This prevented him from ten-
dering payment at the expiration of the lease. The plaintiff later won
the ejectment suit, and now brings a bill for the enforcement of his
option. Held, that the plaintiff's failure to tender payment at the time
specified did not deprive him of his rights under the option agreemeht.
Inequitable or fraudulent conduct by which one party to a contract
makes it impossible for the other to perform a condition precedent to
the first party's liability is usually treated as a waiver of the condition.
Batterbury v. Vyse (1863) 2 H. & C. 42. Upon this ground the conclu-
sion reached in the principal case was undoubtedly correct. But the
court went further and endeavored to justify their decision upon other
grounds, saying: "Equity does not consider the mere fixing of a definite
date for performance as making time of the essence of the contract"
and intimated that even apart from the inequitable conduct of the defend-
ant, the plaintiff would have prevailed. In many cases the courts have
applied this doctrine with the result that they have disregarded the non-
fulfilment of an express condition precedent consisting of payment or
notice, to be made or given at a particular date. Barnard v. Lee (1868)
97 Mass. 94; Jones v. Robbins (1849) 29 Me. 351; Parlin v. Thorald
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(1852) 16 Beav. 59; McLean 'v. Windam (1912) 85 Vt. 167. In all of
these cases the courts preferred to look for the real "intention" of the
parties or to consider "substantial" performance as a substitute. Obvi-
ously, when the courts have done this they have in fact refused to enforce
the legal relatiops arisifig out qf the agreement of the parties, and have
imposed legal relations created by the court. A court of equity, no more
than a court of law, has power to change the terms of a contract, and
it is believed that no search for the "intention' of the parties on the
part of the court should ever justify a refusal to enforce the express
words of the agreement. An express condition precedent whether con-
sidered to be reasonable or unreasonable should always be enforced, for
after all, in the long run, the best test of what the contracting parties
meant is what they said. The other line is represented by the following
cases: Brooke v. Garrod (1857) 2 DeG. & J. 62; Dibbins v. Dibbins
[896] 2 Ch. 348; Kemp v. Humphreys (852) 13 Ill. 573. In all of those
cases time conditions were rightly and strictly enforced. There is a
difference between a contract in which A and B mutually promise to pay
and convey on a day named, and a contract in which B agrees to convey
to A upon condition that payment is made on a specified date Ranelagh
v. Melton (1864) 2 Dr. & Sm. 278. In the latter case tender of payment
on the day set is an express condition precedent and should be enforced.
In the former it may not be, and in such a case it may often be proper
and even necessary for the court to search out the real intention of the
parties. Cf. Bettini v. Gye (1876) I Q.B.D. 183. The court in discussing
the nature of the option said: "This privilege of purchase is not a mere
offer but is a part of the consideration for the stipulations of the lessee,
and any performance of his stipulations was the payment of some con-
sideration towards the acquisition of the deed." If the court meant by
this statement that performance of the covenants of the lease by the
lessee was also part performance of the agreed equivalent to be given
for the conveyance, it was probably error. The promise of the plaintiff
to perform the stipulations of the lease was the consideration given for
his lease-hold interest. That promise was also given in return for the
option privilege. But it was not "consideration towards the acquisition
of the deed." For a detailed treatment of the above points and others
collaterally involved, see Professor Arthur L. Corbin, Option Contracts
(1914) 23 YAM LAW JOURNAL, 641. C. M.
MARRIAGE-PROOF-SUFFIcIENCY TO ESTABLISH.-GREEN v. NEW ORLEANs,
S. & G. I. IL Co. (917) 74 So. (LA.) 717.-The plaintiff sought to estab-
lish a contract of marriage by an indirect mode of inference; the mar-
riage license which by statute was made the direct mode not being offered.
Held, that it must be shown by evidence of a "convincing character"
that the parties entered into their relations with the bona fide intention
of permanently assuming the obligations and responsibilities of marriage;
and that they carried their intentions into effect.
For a discussion of this question with special reference to the subsequent
validation of a marriage illegal in its origin, see (1916) 26 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 145. S. F. D.
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MASTER AND SERVANT-LrABILITy OF CARRIER FOR ACT OF PULLMAN CON-
*DUCTOR.-LouISVILLE AND NASHVILLE R. PR Co. v. MARLIz-T (1916) I86 S. W.
(TENN.) 595.-The plaintiff's husband was stealing a ride on the defend-
ant's train when a Pullman conductor wantonly forced him to leave the
train as it was passing over a trestle. The husband died as a result of
the injuries sustained by his fall. Held, that a railroad company was not
liable for the wanton act of a Pullman conductor in forcing a trespasser
froln a train, where his act was not necessary to protect passengers.
A railroad company is charged with the highest degree of care as
to its passengers. Railroad v. Kuhn (igoi) io7 Tenn. I06; Pennsylvania
Co. v. Roy (188o) 102 U. S. 456. As to trespassers a railroad company
owes them no duty other than not to injure them wantonly or wilfully.
Railroad v. Bogle (1898) OI Tenn. 4o. However proper an ejection may
be, the carrier is liable for harm caused by the ejection at a dangerous
place. Tilbury v. Northern Cent. R. R. Co. (1907) 217 Pa. St. 618;
Brown v. Louisville and N. R. R. Co. (1898) 1O3 Ky. 211. In these cases
the carrier was liable not for putting a trespasser off, but for the manner
in which it was done. The general test of the liability of a master for the
acts of a servant toward a stranger is usually applied in determining
the carrier's liability, i. e., the servant must have been at the time acting
for the master and within the scope of his employment Daley v. Chicago
and N. W. R. R. Co. (I91I) 145 Wis. 249; Harrington v. Boston, etc.,
R. R. Co. (1914) 213 Mass. 338; Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v. King (i8gg) 179
Ill. 91. A Pullman conductor is not a servant of the railroad company.
Robinson v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co. (1014) 237 U. S. 84. But he
will be regarded in law as the servant of the company so far as his mis-
treatment of a passenger is concerned. Accordingly, the railroad com-
pany is held responsible for the negligence of persons in charge of a
Pullman car and for their wilful acts against passengers. Railroad v.
Ray (1898) i0i Tenn. I; Penn. Co. v. Ray, supra; Airey v. Pullman
Palace Car Co. (1898) 5o La. Ann. 648. It seems, however, that as
regards the acts of Pullman employees toward a trespasser, this is not
true. Such employees are not servants of the railroad company, except
in so far as their acts are necessary to protect passengers. Williams v.
Pullman Palace Car Co. (1888) 4o La. Ann. 417. The principal case is
in accord with Blake v. Kansas City Southern R. R. Co. (9o5) 38 Tex.
Civ. App. 337 on a similar state of facts.
S. j. T.
OPrION CONTRACTS-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-UNILATERAL CONTRAC.-
DITTENFASS V. HORSLEY (1917) 56 N. Y. L. J. 2195.-The defendant in con-
sideration of one dollar agreed to sell to the plaintiff's assignor certain
stocks upon condition that payment be made at a designated time. Later,
the parties agreed that payment be made at a certain place. The money
was ready, but the defendant failed to appear to receive it The assign-
ment to the plaintiff was made subsequent to the attempted payment, and
he has ever since been ready and willing to perform. Held, that the
plaintiff was not entitled to a decree for the specific transfer of the
shares because there was no mutuality of obligation, the original pur-
chaser being under no duty to perform.
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If the option set out in the evidence was a mere offer to sell, then in
accordance with its terms acceptance by paying money to the defendant
was necessary in order to complete a binding contract. In that view of
the case the payment never having been made there was no acceptance
of the offer, and therefore no contract. But the option in this case
amounted to something more than an offer to sell; in fact, the option
agreement was from the first a unilateral contract to sell and transfer
stock upon condition that payment be made at a certain time. The
subsequent agreement as to place of payment was an ordinary bilateral
agreement consisting of mutual promises. The court's opinion that this
latter agreement was without consideration was, therefore, probably
erroneous. By these agreements the defendant placed himself under a
liability to the promisee which because of the consideration paid him he
could not extinguish by revocation. There was also created in the other
party a power which if exercised would operate to put the defendant
under a legal duty to deliver the shares of stock. The performance of
such a condition in the case of land options of a similar nature has been
held in innumerable cases to create not only a legal duty in the defendant
but also an equitable duty. Ross v. Parks (189o) 93 Ala. 153; cf. Johns-
ton v. Trippe (1887) 33 Fed. 530; Smith v. Bangham (i909) 156 Cal.
359. The court in the principal case thought that, as there was no
mutuality of remedies, there could be no decree for specific performance.
In each of the cases cited the same rule was presented to the court and
dismissed as not being applicable. Obviously, it always must be so held
if the courts are to enforce unilateral contracts, for in such contracts the
duties being all on one side, there can be but one party entitled to a
remedy. Because of their peculiar nature when not obtainable in the
open market, shares of stock of a private corporation have always been
considered to be proper subject matter for equitable relief, and it is not
easy to understand why option contracts that are specifically enforceable
as regards land are not enforceable in cases like the one under discussion.
It is submitted that the decision is contrary to precedent and sound legal
reasoning. Two other considerations are necessary in this case to show
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. The defendant having made it
impossible for the other party to perform the condition, and the tender
remaining good, the defendant's duty to transfer was absolute and should
have been enforced. Rockland-R. Lime Co. v. Leary (19II) 2o3 N. Y.
469. Of course an assignee by performing in like manner should be
granted the same relief. Cf. House v. Jackson (1893) 24 Or. 89. See
Professor Arthur L. Corbin, Option Contracts (914) 23 YALE LAW
JoURNAL, 641. C. M.
SALES-FRAUD ON SELLER By IMPERSONATION.-PHELPS V. MCQU.ADE
(1917) 115 N. E. (N. Y.) 44i.-A person, for value and without notice
of the defect in title, bought personal property from one who had obtained
it by falsely representing himself to be another. Held, that his title was
paramount to that of the original vendor; also that if the owner intended
to sell the property to the person with whom he dealt, the title passed,
though he may have been deceived as to his identity, or responsibility,
and an innocent purchaser from the fraudulent vendee was protected.
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There are three types of cases that have arisen, involving the effect
of fraud by impersonation on the passing of title. In the last analysis it
is a question of the intention of the parties. The principal case follows
the doctrine laid down in the Massachusetts courts, where it has been
held that the fraudulent vendee gets a voidable title, the dominant inten-
tion of vendor being to pass title to the person who stands before him,
and with whom he is dealing. Edmunds v. Merchants' Despatch Co.
(1883) 135 Mass. 283; Hickey v. McDonald (i9o7) x51 Ala. 497; Willis-
ton, Sales, sec. 635; see also 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 413. A Missouri case
is opposed to the above in reasoning, if not in actual decision. Loeffel
v. Pohlman (1892) 47 Mo. App. 574. In another class of cases, goods
have been ordered by mail by a defrauder, who writes in the name of
some other person in good credit, thereby inducing the vendor to ship
the goods to the writer of the letter. It has been held that a bona fide
purchaser for value and without notice is not protected, on the ground
that the fraudulent vendee has not obtained title. Cundy v. Lindsay
(878) 3 App. Cas. 459; Newberry v. Norfolk Ry. Co. (1903) 133 N. C.
45. The fact that the vendor deals with the vendee personally rather
than by letter is material in determining the question of intent. The third
class of cases arises where a person fraudulently represents that he is
the agent of another, and thereby obtains possession of the goods. In
such a .case the weight of authority is that no title passes, inasmuch as
the vendor intends the title to pass to a principal, who in fact has not
ordered the goods, and the agent gets no title, since the seller does not
intend to transfer the property in the goods to him. Kingsford v. Merry
(1856) 1 H. & N. 503; Rodliff v. Dallinger (1886) 141 Mass. I; Hentz v.
Miller (1883) 94 N. Y. 64; contra, Hawkins v. Davis & Baxter (1875)
Tenn. 5o6; Sword v. Young (189o) 89 Tenn. 126.
J. I. S.
